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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last season of the popular American sitcom Friends, two of the
main characters, a married couple, discovered that they were infertile
and decided to adopt a baby. They were delighted to learn that a
potential birth mother1 wanted to meet them, and then dismayed to learn
that there had been a mix-up. She thought they were another couple: a
minister and a doctor. The couple pretended to be what the birth mother
expected, making up stories about their church and medical practice
until the husband was overcome by guilt and confessed their deceit.
Feeling betrayed, the birth mother attempted to leave, but the husband
stopped her and apologized, explaining that they just wanted to be
parents and that his wife was a wonderful mother without a child. The
birth mother accepted this explanation and agreed to place her baby with
them.2 Throughout a series of episodes dealing with the adoption process,
the show portrayed the infertile married couple as a loving pair who
deserved a baby, and portrayed the birth mother as a sweet but
scatterbrained girl who was unsure of the identity of the birth father.3

1. The terms birth mother, birth father, birth parent, and birth relative are used
throughout this Comment to refer to the biological relatives of a child placed for
adoption. Not all birth parents are comfortable with these terms because some feel that
the terms minimize their role. See, e.g., Diane Turski, Why Birthmother Means Breeder,
http://www.exiledmothers.com/adoption_facts/Why_Birthmother_Means_Breeder.html
(last visited June 26, 2007) (“‘[B]irthmother’ is simply a euphemism for ‘incubator’ or
‘breeder.’”). This Author understands and respects this position and intends no
disrespect by the use of these terms. Rather, the terms were selected because they are
consistently used in the literature in this area, and are almost universally understood.
The treatment of these terms as separate or compound words, “birth mother” versus
“birthmother,” is inconsistent in the literature. This Author has chosen the former
because it allows for less common combinations like “birth relatives,” but has left
compound uses intact when they appear in quotations from sources that favor that usage.
2. Friends: The One with the Birth Mother (NBC television broadcast Jan. 8,
2004).
3. Id.; Friends: The One where Joey Speaks French (NBC television broadcast
Feb. 19, 2004); Friends: The One with Rachel’s Going Away Party (NBC television
broadcast Apr. 29, 2004); Friends: The Last One (NBC television broadcast May 6,
2004).
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At one level, this story is just another variation on the classic theme of
mistaken identity followed by zany antics.4 At a deeper level, however,
it may reflect the way society views the adults who are involved in
adoption.5 That view seems to be that adopting parents are good people,
and they are justified in doing whatever needs to be done to give a child
a good home. Birth parents, on the other hand, are foolish, immoral, or
both, and it is okay to lie to them to get a child because the end goal of
parenting is noble, and the child will be better off with the new family.
To some extent these ideas also find expression in the adoption laws of
this country,6 but over the last thirty years both this view and the laws
governing adoption have been changing.7
One element of this change has been an increase in “open adoptions.”8
Ironically, though, as birth parents have gained more power in selection
4. This is one of the oldest plot devices in comedy. See, e.g., WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE COMEDY OF ERRORS (T.S. Dorsch ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
5. See David Elkind, Adolescents, Parenting, and the Media in the Twenty-First
Century, 4 ADOLESCENT MED. 599, 605 (1993) (arguing that media images “reflect and
buttress” society’s changing views of the family). There is some disagreement among
sociologists as to whether society’s values influence television or vice versa. For an
interesting discussion of this topic, see Michael Morgan et al., Television and Family
Values: Was Dan Quayle Right?, 2 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 47 (1999).
6. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy M., 272 Cal. Rptr. 27, 32 n.3 (Ct. App. 1990)
(criticizing trial judge’s praise of the “self-sacrifice” of adopting parents and
condemnation of the morals of the birth parents). Of course, the law has never permitted
obvious fraud in this context, but it did afford adopting parents broad discretion in
making decisions about the adopted child, even where those decisions conflicted with
promises made to the birth parent. For example:
[A]doptive parents have the same right of custody and control of the child as if
that child had been born to them and blood parents are relieved of all their
legal duties and divested of all their legal rights in respect to the adopted child.
An agreement providing for visitation by a third party would impair the
adoptive parents’ rights. Such an agreement might also impair the new parentchild relationship with very undesirable consequences. We find that such an
agreement is unenforceable.
Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681, 681–82 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).
7. For an excellent summary of the development of American adoption law and
its recent changes, see Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption:
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1003–
13 (1995).
8. Open adoption is defined as:
[A] process in which the birthparents and the adoptive parents meet and
exchange identifying information. The birthparents relinquish legal and basic
childrearing rights to the adoptive parents. Both sets of parents retain the right
to continuing contact and access to knowledge on behalf of the child. Within
this definition, there is room for greater and lesser degrees of contact between
the parties.
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of and access to adopting parents through the growth of independent9
and open adoptions,10 they have also become more vulnerable to
deception by those eager to facilitate adoptions.11 Because birth parents
are more able to negotiate for ongoing contact, adopting parents sometimes
feel pressured to promise a level of openness or contact that they do not
really desire or intend in order to get a birth parent to place a child with
them.12 However, if they make such a promise and renege on it once the
adoption is final, the birth parent may not have legal recourse because
postadoption contact agreements are unenforceable in many states.13
Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Open Adoption, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION
316, 318 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990). As the Supreme
Court of Connecticut noted, the term “open adoption” is something of a misnomer.
“[O]pen adoption” . . . conveys a misleading impression of what such agreements
intend to accomplish. The plaintiff does not seek to “open,” to set aside or to
diminish in any way the adoptive process that has substituted the defendants as
the legal parents of the child. The plaintiff’s rights are not premised on an ongoing
genetic relationship that somehow survives a termination of parental rights and
adoption. Instead, the plaintiff is asking us to decide whether, as an adult who
has had an ongoing personal relationship with the child, she may contract with
the adopting parents, prior to adoption, for the continued right to visit with the
child, so long as that visitation continues to be in the best interest of the child.
Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 740–41 (Conn. 1988).
9. The term “independent adoption” refers to adoptions arranged privately
between the adopting parents and the birth parents without the assistance of an adoption
agency. Actual statistics on the number and types of adoptions have been difficult to
collect because there is no comprehensive national data collection system, particularly
for private agency and independent adoptions, and because of the privacy protections in
place for adoption. However, one study shows that the percentage of independently
arranged adoptions declined steadily after adoptions became more formalized in the
middle of the twentieth century, reached a low of 21% in 1971, and then increased to
31% in 1986. Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 26, 30.
10. Specific statistics on this are unavailable for the reasons given in note 9.
However, the growing number of state legislatures and courts that have addressed the
issue suggests that the practice is common, see infra note 13, and most commentators
agree, see, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 445 (2004).
11. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 330.
12. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 917–22 (1991) (arguing that, due to the
shortage of adoptable infants, adoption is now a “provider’s market” and birth parents
can “dictate whimsical requirements for the adoptive home”). For an example of
adoptive parents reconsidering the terms of a postadoption visitation agreement after the
adoption became final, see Groves v. Clark, 982 P.2d 446, 447–48 (Mont. 1999).
13. Three states have specific statutory provisions prohibiting enforcement of
postadoption contact agreements. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:14 (West, Westlaw
through 2007 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.62, 3107.63, 3107.65 (West,
Westlaw through 2007 legislation); TENN CODE ANN. § 36-1-121 (West, Westlaw
through 2007 First Reg. Sess.). Another seven states have case law indicating that
postadoption contact agreements are not enforceable. See In re Adoption of Hammer,
487 P.2d 417, 420 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); People ex rel. MM, 726 P.2d 1108, 1124–25
(Colo. 1986); In re MM, 619 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ill. 1993); Birth Mother v. Adoptive
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This adds to the emotional pain of an already traumatic experience for
birth parents,14 and it cheats other adopting parents, such as the actual
minister and doctor in the sitcom example above, of the opportunity to
parent that child.
At first blush it may seem that this problem could be avoided because,
as voluntarily entered agreements with consideration—the placement of
the baby with a particular family in exchange for a promise of continuing
contact by the adoptive parent—such arrangements would be enforceable
under normal contract law.15 However, adoption is a creature of state
statutory law,16 and for both this reason and important public policy
reasons,17 adoption is not governed by general common law contract
Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1235–36 (Nev. 2002); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d
1246, 1259 (N.J. 1999); Lowe v. Clayton, 212 S.E.2d 582, 587 (S.C. 1975); Stickles v.
Reichardt, 234 N.W. 728, 730 (Wis. 1931). Seven states have statutory provisions
allowing some limited enforcement, but excluding many agreements involving adoptions
of infants voluntarily relinquished at birth. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West, Westlaw
through 2007 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427 (West, Westlaw through 2007 First
Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-16-1 to 31-19-16-9 (West, Westlaw through 2007
Pub. Laws); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.
Acts); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-5-301 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-5.6f (West, Westlaw through 2007 First Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). Only ten states have
statutory provisions providing for the enforcement of all voluntary postadoption
contact agreements, subject to a “best interests of the child” standard. ALASKA
STAT. § 25.23.180(j), (l) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-112, 45a-715 (West,
Westlaw through Jan. 2007 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-308, 5-3A-08,
5-3B-07 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 6C
(West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58 (West, Westlaw
through 2007 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §32A-5-35 (West, Westlaw through June
2007 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112-b (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.305 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-6-17 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.33.295 (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation). The remaining states lack
explicit statutory provisions or clear case law on the subject.
14. Anne B. Brodzinsky, Surrendering an Infant for Adoption: The Birthmother
Experience, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 8, at 295, 304 (“[F]or many
women, the experience of surrendering an infant for adoption is a nearly intolerable
loss.”).
15. For a contract to be valid in California, it must have (1) parties capable of
contracting; (2) consent; (3) a lawful object; and (4) consideration. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550
(West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). For a definition of consideration, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
16. In re Baby Boy M., 272 Cal. Rptr. 27, 29 (Ct. App. 1990) (“The law of adoptions is
purely statutory.” (citing In re Adoption of McDonald, 274 P.2d 860 (1954))).
17. In re Jaren's Adoption, 27 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 1947) (“[T]he public, as
well as those immediately concerned, have vital interests in matters of this nature, since,
obviously, it is a matter of immediate concern to all members of the state.”).
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principles.18 Thus the enforceability of postadoption contact agreements
varies widely from state to state.19 This body of state law is evolving
every year as legislatures and courts continue to struggle with competing
policy considerations regarding how much openness to permit and
protect in adoption.20
California’s statute on postadoption contact agreements21 provides an
excellent illustration of this evolution. California began regulating agreements
for postadoption contact by allowing “kinship adoption agreements” in
1997.22 Kinship adoption agreements were intended to encourage adoptions
of youth in the dependency system by family members.23 The law was
changed in 2000 to allow “postadoption contact agreements” in all adoptions
where they are voluntarily entered into by all parties and are in the best
interests of the child.24 These agreements are currently enforceable
under California Family Code section 8616.5, but they are limited to
sharing information about the child and cannot include visitation if the
birth relative and the child did not have an existing relationship before
the adoption.25 Moreover, although in adoptions out of the dependency
system the social worker is to inform the birth parents of the opportunity
to form postadoption contact agreements,26 in all other adoptions there is

18. See, e.g., Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Nev. 2002)
(“[W]ithout such a specific Nevada statutory provision [allowing agreements for
postadoption contact], the agreement between the birth mother and the adoptive parents
is unenforceable.”).
19. See supra note 13. This inconsistency makes negotiating postadoption contact
especially difficult in interstate adoptions because the parties must determine which
state’s laws will control and how that state views these agreements.
20. For example, Maryland has recently enacted a bill that provides broad
enforcement of postadoption contact agreements. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-308,
5-3A-08, 5-3B-07 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). This is not necessarily a
departure from prior practice. Maryland courts have recognized that these agreements
could be enforced in equity since the 1980s, but it does signal new recognition of the
value of these agreements. See Weinschel v. Strople, 466 A.2d 1301 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983).
21. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
22. Id. § 8714.7.
23. 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 793. Kinship adoption agreements preceded and are different
from “Kin-GAP” guardianships. Kin-GAP guardianships provide another arrangement,
short of adoption, to make it easier for family members to provide care for children who
would otherwise be in the foster care system. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11360–
11375 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
24. 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 910.
25. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
26. Id. § 8715(b). The corresponding regulations clarify that the agency must
inform both the adoptive and birth parents of the availability of postadoption contact
agreements. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 35179.1 (2005). Notably, these regulations have
not been updated to reflect the new terminology or expanded scope of these agreements,
but rather refer to them as kinship adoption agreements which apply only to relatives.
Id.
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no affirmative duty on California courts or adoption facilitators to inform
birth parents of this option.27
This Comment argues that California should continue the evolution of
its statutory scheme by: (1) allowing and enforcing visitation terms in all
adoption agreements that meet the statutory requirements of voluntariness
and the best interests of the child,28 and (2) requiring that the consent
process inform all birth parents of the possibility of these agreements.
Part II explores the history and current status of California’s treatment of
postadoption contact agreements, including the protections provided for
adoptive parents and adopted children. Part III demonstrates that the
current limitation on visitation is arbitrary and unnecessary and that
important policy considerations support removing it. Part III also analyzes
the arguments against expanding the law to allow visitation and concludes
that these concerns are outweighed by the policies favoring expansions.
Part IV focuses on the need to inform all birth parents of their options in
this regard. Finally, Part V provides specific recommendations for amending
the California postadoption contact agreement statute to better serve the
interests of all parties and the State’s public policy goals. Though this
Comment focuses on California law, the ideas explored here are applicable
to all states.29
II. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF CALIFORNIA LAW
Prior to 1997, California had no statutory provision directly related to
postadoption contact agreements, and the State’s case law had not
clearly addressed the enforceability of such agreements. Two California
Court of Appeals cases decided in 1984 and 1985 held that courts could
not award visitation to a birth relative after the child had been adopted,
but neither involved a prior voluntary agreement between the adoptive

27. The legislature has not yet required notice of this option in other adoptions,
and in the absence of a statutory requirement, it does not rise to the level of a due process
right. See In re Kimberly S., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 1999); In re Zachary D., 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Ct. App. 1999).
28. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
29. This discussion is particularly relevant to Indiana, Louisiana, and Rhode
Island, which have all limited enforcement of postadoption visitation agreements to
situations where the adopted child has some sort of relationship with the birth parent.
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Pub. Laws); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess. Acts); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 157-14.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
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parent and the birth relatives in question.30 Several other cases acknowledged
the existence of open adoptions, but none specifically ruled on the
enforceability of agreements for ongoing contact.31
Thus, the legislature was dealing with a clean slate when it made its
first foray into this area with the passage of California Family Code
section 8714.7 in 1997.32 This statute allowed formal, enforceable agreements
for ongoing contact in cases where children were being adopted by a
relative, and was intended to promote adoption out of the foster care
system.33 The legislature made this intention explicit in section 8714.5
of the Family Code:
It is the intent of the Legislature to expedite legal permanency for children who
cannot return to their parents and to remove barriers to adoption by relatives of
children who are already in the dependency system or who are at risk of
entering the dependency system.
This goal will be achieved by empowering families, including extended families, to
care for their own children safely and permanently whenever possible, by
preserving existing family relationships, thereby causing the least amount of
disruption to the child and the family . . . .34

The 1997 law was both popular and successful. The California
Adoption Initiative Update issued by the Department of Social Services
credited section 8714.7 as one of the reforms that allowed them to increase
the number of public agency adoptions in California by 88% over three
years, and to increase the proportion of children adopted from long term
foster care by 42%.35
Inspired by the success of kinship adoption agreements, the legislature
amended the law in 2000, changing the name of the agreements to
“postadoption contact agreements” and expanding their applicability to
all adoptions, regardless of whether the child was related to the adopting
parent.36 This version of the statute allows for enforcement of agreements
for visitation between the child and various birth relatives with whom he
30. Huffman v. Grob, 218 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Ct. App. 1985); Marckwardt v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1984).
31. See In re Sylvia R., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 1997); In re Teneka W.,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 668 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Alma B., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 592, 595 (Ct.
App. 1994); In re Baby Boy M., 272 Cal. Rptr. 27, 33 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Angela R.,
260 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1989).
32. 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 793.
33. Id.
34. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.5(a)(1), (a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg.
Sess.) (section numbers omitted).
35. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1–2 (Cal. 2000), available at
CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 3/28/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose
of legislation).
36. 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 910.
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or she had an existing relationship.37 Birth relatives who did not have an
existing relationship with the child can have postadoption contact agreements,
but these must be limited to the sharing of information about the child.38
The 1997 and 2000 versions of the statute resided in Chapter 2 of the
Adoption Division of the Family Code, which pertains to agency adoptions,
specifically those out of the dependency system.39 To make clear that
the postadoption contact agreement section applies to all adoptions,
not just those out of dependency, in 2003 the legislature renumbered it
to place it in the general provisions of Chapter 1, giving it its current
section number of 8616.5.40 In 2004, the legislature made an additional
amendment to allow Indian Tribes to be parties to postadoption contact
agreements where the child being adopted is American Indian.41 Thus,
the current law provides the option of postadoption contact agreements for
birth relatives and Indian Tribes in all adoptions, but limits the agreements
to exchange of information about the child in situations where there is no
existing relationship between the child and the birth relative. The Family
Code does not define “existing relationship,” 42 but it seems clear that this
provision intends to prohibit visitation by birth parents who surrender
their children at birth.43

37. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7(b)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
38. Id. § 8714.7(b)(2).
39. There is some indication that the legislature initially only intended the statute
to apply to adoptions from the dependency system, and felt it was unnecessary for
private adoptions. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on
S.B. 2157 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Human Servs., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3
(Cal. 2000), available at CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Assem., 6/21/2000 (Westlaw) (“Postadoptive
contact agreements are routinely utilized in the private adoption system. This bill
authorizes the use of open adoption agreements for the adoption of youth in the juvenile
dependency system in the same manner they are used in the private adoption system.”).
40. 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 251.
41. 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 858. Additional minor amendments to clarify these
provisions relating to Indian Tribes recently became law. 2006 Cal. Stat. ch. 838, § 9.
42. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8500–8548 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
43. Other states with similar statutory limitations on postadoption contact use
slightly clearer language. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2 (West, Westlaw through 2007
Pub. Laws) (allowing postadoption contact privileges where “the child is at least two (2)
years of age and the court finds that there is a significant emotional attachment between
the child and the birth parent”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw
through 2006 Sess. Acts) (enforcing agreements where “[t]he child has an established,
significant relationship with that person to the extent that its loss would cause substantial
harm to the child”); R.I. G EN . L AWS § 15-7-14.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006
legislation) (requiring a finding by the court that there is a “significant emotional
attachment between the child and the birth parent”).

363

WIDNER.DOC

8/15/2007 2:56:32 PM

The restriction on visitation is not the only limitation on postadoption
contact agreements. The statute has always provided significant protections
for adoptive parents and adopted children who are parties to these
agreements. Most importantly, the agreement must be voluntary, in
writing, and in the best interests of the child.44 This means that
(1) adopting parents cannot be forced by the courts to allow visitation
to which they have not willingly consented;45 (2) birth relatives cannot
make spurious claims of agreement where none exists in writing; and
(3) the court must scrutinize any agreement before it to ensure it will not
be harmful to the child involved. The child is considered a party to the
agreement and, if twelve or older, is required to give written consent.46
This gives the child some protection against being forced to continue a
relationship with a birth relative with whom he or she does not wish to
retain contact.47 The adoption cannot be set aside for failure to comply
with the agreement,48 nor can monetary damages be granted for breach.49
Thus, the worst result facing a party who breaches the agreement is an
order enforcing visitation, and even this can be avoided if the breaching

44. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
45. Though the courts have not yet considered the constitutional implications of
this aspect of voluntariness, it should prevent the statute from running afoul of
Fourteenth Amendment protection of a parent’s right to “make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
The Troxel Court held that in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness, court-ordered
visitation for birth grandparents is unconstitutional. Id. at 70. The visitation in that case is
distinguishable from postadoption contact agreements because it was not voluntarily
consented to by the parent. For a fuller discussion of Troxel and parental autonomy, see
infra text accompanying notes 156–161.
46. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(d) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
Though it is progressive of California to make the child a party to the contract, the
choice of age twelve seems arbitrary. Is a ten-year-old any less interested in this decision
or less able to understand the situation? Though it may be arbitrary, California’s position is
consistent with other states that make the child a party to these contracts, such as Indiana
and Rhode Island, which both also use age twelve. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2(6)
(West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. Laws); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1(b)(5) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
47. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(d) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). This
section does provide an exception to the requirement that a child give consent if the court
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agreement is in the best interests of
the child. It seems unlikely, however, that the court would make such a finding if the
child were strongly opposed to the contact.
48. Id. § 8616.5(e)(1), (k).
49. Id. § 8616.5(g). Subsection (g) references subsection (e) which provides
warnings that must be included in the postadoption contact agreement. Id. The contents
of these warnings are not otherwise set out in the statute, but, based on both the
importance of their contents and the cross-references to them, they seem to be intended
as independent provisions as well as warnings.
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party can demonstrate that enforcement would not be in the best interests
of the child.50
The legislature also limited the potential financial burden of enforcement
actions. Petitioners must at least attempt to mediate the dispute in good
faith prior to bringing a court action,51 and the costs for mediation or
dispute resolution are borne by each party, excluding the child.52 Thus,
even if the birth relative accuses the adoptive parents of breaching the
agreement, a costly trial can be avoided by resolving the matter in mediation.
In the event that mediation fails and the dispute does end up in court,
costs can be minimized because neither testimony nor an evidentiary
hearing is required.53 The person bringing the action must bear the costs
of litigation unless it is found that a party, other than the child, breached
the agreement without good cause.54
There have been no published cases interpreting the current version of
section 8616.5. Two notable cases did weigh in on the original kinship
adoption agreement statute,55 however, and seem to apply to postadoption
contact agreements. These cases, In re Kimberly S.56 and In re Zachary
D.,57 both held that birth parents losing their parental rights did not have
to be told that kinship adoption agreements could provide them an
option for ongoing contact with their children. The Third District Court
of Appeals acknowledged that, at least in some cases, notification would
be desirable, but found that the legislature had not required it.58 The
Fifth District Court of Appeals noted that birth parents had no due
process right to notification.59
50. Id. § 8616.5(h). Although this Comment began by suggesting that the adoptive
parents may be the ones tempted to breach the agreement, the statutory language suggests that
the agreement is enforceable against all parties, including the birth relatives, if it is in the
best interests of the child.
51. Id. § 8616.5(f).
52. Id. § 8616.5(i).
53. Id. § 8616.5 (f), (h)(2)(C). Protection from unexpected costs is a vital part of
this statute. Adopting parents might otherwise be deterred from entering into a
postadoption contact agreement for fear of having the expense of litigating it if
something goes wrong, and birth parents often have fewer financial resources, and may
not be able to afford an expensive trial to enforce their rights under an agreement.
54. Id. § 8616.5(i).
55. Id. § 8714.7.
56. 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 1999).
57. 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Ct. App. 1999).
58. Id. at 408, 410.
59. In re Kimberly S., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747. It should be noted that both
Kimberly S. and Zachary D. were dependency cases, where the birth parents’ parental

365

WIDNER.DOC

8/15/2007 2:56:32 PM

Following Kimberly S. and Zachary D., the state legislature passed the
2000 amendments to what is now the postadoption contact agreement
statute. One of the amendments requires that the social study conducted
for the court in dependency cases address whether or not the social
worker discussed a postadoption contact agreement with the child’s birth
parents.60 However, this language applies only to adoptions out of the
dependency system, and it does not reach birth parents who are voluntarily
relinquishing children in independent or private agency adoptions.61
III. THE CASE FOR EXPANDING THE AVAILABILITY OF
VISITATION TO ALL ADOPTIONS
Several important public policy considerations favor expanding the
visitation provisions of California Family Code section 8616.5. These
include the best interests of the child, the well-being of the birth parent,
fairness considerations, and the encouragement of adoption.
A. Best Interests of the Child
Under the statute, the best interests of the child standard can be used
to protect against unhealthy postadoption contact.62 However, in many
cases, the best interests of the child will be served by an ongoing relationship
with a birth relative. By knowing the birth relative, the adoptee will be
better able to navigate through the unique identity issues adoptees face
and will have easy access to medical and family background information.
rights were terminated by the court. In California, attorneys are generally appointed for
parents in these cases, so arguably the birth parents should have been informed of the
availability of kinship adoption agreements by their counsel. See CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). But see In re Kimberly S., 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747 (holding that counsel’s failure to advise about availability of kinship
adoption agreements did not require reversal of order terminating parental rights).
60. 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 930 (“This bill would require the social study to also
contain a specified discussion regarding the parent’s option to enter into a postadoption
contact agreement, thereby imposing new duties on local personnel and creating a statemandated local program.”); see also Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements:
Hearing on S.B. 2157 Before the S. Rules Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal.
2000), available at CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 7/03/2000 (Westlaw) (“This would ensure
that birth parents are aware of this option, and thus perhaps alleviate their concerns and
resistance to placing their child for adoption.”). Although it is not explicitly stated in the
legislative history, the timing indicates that the amendment may be a reaction to the
courts’ holdings in Kimberly S. and Zachary D.
61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8715(b) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). The
need to expand this provision to reach these other types of adoptions is discussed further
in Part IV of this Comment. See infra Part IV.
62. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(f) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg.
Sess.) (“The court may not order compliance with the agreement absent a finding that . . .
the enforcement is in the best interests of the child.”).
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Psychologists have identified several identity issues unique to adoptees63
which can lead to shame, embarrassment, and lowered self esteem.64
Two of these identity issues can be alleviated, at least partially, by allowing
the child to build a relationship with a birth relative. The first is prolongation
of family romance fantasy, a typically brief period in normal development
when children doubt they are their parents’ children and imagine other,
better parents.65 It develops as a way of coping with disappointment and
ambivalence toward parents.66 For adoptees, this fantasy has a dimension
of reality because there are other parents. In closed adoptions, the child can
become fixated on imagining the unknown parents, impeding their
overall identification process.67 If the child is allowed visitation with the
birth parent, however, then they cannot create a new image from whole
cloth. Though the child may still fantasize about life with the birth parents,
these fantasies will be more grounded in reality, and the adoptive parents
are likely to compare more favorably than they would to a fiction.
The second identity issue that visitation can address is “genealogical
bewilderment.”68 This term was coined by H. J. Sants in 1964,69 and
many psychologists have since built upon it.70 Though descriptions vary
somewhat, this bewilderment can be summed up as confusion and
uncertainty resulting from lack of knowledge of the adoptee’s background,
inability to identify with the adoptive parents because of hereditary
differences in appearance or intelligence, 71 and impaired identity
formation “because an essential part of himself or herself has been cut
off and remains unknown.”72 This concept is not unique to psychological
literature; it is also a theme of the open adoption records movement, or

63. Although there is no consensus that identity problems are more severe for
adoptees than for other children, resolving identity issues is more complex for adopted
adolescents. Janet L. Hoopes, Adoption and Identity Formation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ADOPTION, supra note 8, at 144, 149.
64. Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 318.
65. Hoopes, supra note 63, at 152.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. H. J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents,
37 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133, 133 (1964).
70. See Hoopes, supra note 63, at 152–53.
71. Sants, supra note 69, at 136, 138. Sants described this as a lack of “biological
link.” Id. at 138.
72. Hoopes, supra note 63, at 152.
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“search movement.”73 Betty Jean Lifton, an adoptee and prominent
search activist, calls it “cosmic loneliness” and explains:
Without concrete information about the circumstances of your birth, especially
about the woman who gave you life, the adoptee often has the sense of not
having been born at all. . . . The adoptee feels alone in the world. Connected to
his adoptive home by the fragmentary adoption narrative and disconnected from
his real biological narrative, he has lost his place on the intergenerational chain
of being.74

Some argue that the need to know one’s origins is not as universal as
these psychologists and search activists would have us believe, but this
does not diminish the fact that it is a very real need for many adoptees.75
Birth relative visitation clearly and directly addresses the genealogical
bewilderment problem. Instead of being “cut off” from their origins,76
children who visit with their birth relatives can receive direct answers to
their questions and learn their full biological “narratives.”77 Additionally,
visitation can help relieve the sense of rejection that is often conveyed
by a birth parent’s absence.78
In additional to these psychological benefits, a personal relationship
with the birth relative supports physical health by providing ready access
to medical information. Although many states require that background
medical information be provided at the time of adoption,79 this information
may be incomplete because many hereditary diseases develop later in
adulthood and may not have shown up by the time of the adoption.80

73. See KATARINA WEGAR, ADOPTION, IDENTITY AND KINSHIP 8–10 (1997). The
“search movement” was a social movement, primarily made up of adoptees, but also
some birth parents, seeking more openness in adoption records. For an excellent history
of this movement, see Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the
History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367 (2001).
74. BETTY JEAN LIFTON, JOURNEY OF THE ADOPTED SELF: A QUEST FOR WHOLENESS
46–47 (1994).
75. Katarina Wegar states:
Arguments based on the real desire of adoptees to know or meet their
biological relatives need not be based on essentialist or universalist assumption
of innate sources. Considering the weight attributed to the biological
underpinnings of parent-child relationships in this society, it is both cruel and
unreasonable to expect adoptees and their biological parents to feel otherwise.
WEGAR, supra note 73, at 136–37.
76. Hoopes, supra note 63, at 152.
77. LIFTON, supra note 74, at 47.
78. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’
Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 531 (2005).
79. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8706 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
80. Many of the leading causes of death are hereditary and do not take strike until
middle age or the senior years. The University Hospital, Adult Onset Disease Program
Introduction, http://www.theuniversityhospital.com/adultgenetics/intro.htm (last visited
July 2, 2007).
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In summary, allowing the maximum amount of contact agreeable to
the parties supports a child’s best interests by promoting his or her mental,
emotional, and physical well-being.
B. Well-being of the Birth Parent
The child is not the only party whose best interests may be served by
postadoption visitation.81 Birth parents may also benefit from knowing
their child and seeing them happy and successful in the adoptive
environment.82 The old view, that closed adoption helps birth parents
put an unfortunate experience behind them and get on with their lives,
has proved to be fiction.83 Social workers and psychologists now recognize
that “[g]iving birth to a child and being that child’s birth mother is a fact
of life that cannot be wiped out.”84
It is not simply that the birth experience cannot be wiped out; it
produces an intense and ongoing sense of loss which has long-term
consequences for the life of the birth mother.85 For example, one study
found that 71% of birth mothers believed that their experience had
negatively impacted their subsequent marital relationships.86 Although
most formal studies have focused on birth mothers, there is clinical
evidence that birth fathers also experience this sense of loss, which
results in feelings of grief and anger.87 This feeling of loss stems, at
least in part, from the absence of the child from the birth parent’s life.
The birth parent experiences grief similar to that encountered by
someone facing the death of a loved one.88 This problem may be
81. Though this section focuses on the well-being of the birth parents, an open
relationship can benefit the adoptive parents as well. At a minimum, the adoptive
parents can benefit from the increased well-being of their child and access to their
medical history. See supra text accompanying notes 62–80. They can also benefit by
developing a relationship with someone with whom they share a unique bond: their love
of the child.
82. Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 329 (“Birthmothers, who are comfortable
with their decision and able to know how that child is progressing, are better able to
move forward.”).
83. VIVIAN B. SHAPIRO ET AL., COMPLEX ADOPTION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY 148 (2001); see also Brodzinsky, supra note 14, at 295–300 (discussing
historical perspectives on the birthmother experience and their development).
84. Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 329.
85. See Brodzinsky, supra note 14, at 300–03.
86. Id. at 301.
87. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 155.
88. Brodzinsky, supra note 14, at 310–14 (suggesting a bereavement model based
on mourning norms after a death to help birth parents deal with their loss).
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compounded in the adoption context because if the child was
relinquished at birth, birth parents may be unable to avail themselves of
some of the most important salves of the grieving process, including
reminiscing about the lost love one, sharing stories, and receiving sympathy
from others who share the loss.89 Visitation can provide these tools of
mourning back to the birth parent by giving them stories to tell about the
child and a connection with others who care about the child.
While openness in adoptions, including visitation, will help some birth
parents cope with the loss of a child, it will not help all of them. Some
find the closure of a closed adoption helpful in the immediate moment of
loss.90 But for some birth parents openness provides important benefits.
As one text put it:
Open adoption enables some birth parents to internalize a less negative sense of
themselves because they have chosen the adoptive parents whom they feel will
value and treasure their child. The separation from the baby can be less
traumatic, relieving guilt and allowing the birth mother to move on more easily
with her own development.91

It is true that visitation is not strictly necessary for the birth parent to
benefit from openness. Different degrees of contact will work better for
different sets of birth parents and adoptive parents.92 Still, knowing that
visitation may mitigate the negative impact of adoption for some birth
parents, we should allow them the flexibility to negotiate for the degree
of contact that they feel is appropriate.
C. Fairness
Principles of fairness also support a broader scope of visitation in
postadoption contact agreements for two reasons. First, California’s own
forms are unfairly misleading under the current law. Second, because
visitation agreements are created irrespective of the current statute, their
unenforceability can create situations of deceit and unfair gain.
The fact that California Family Code section 8616.5 does not provide
for visitation in situations where the birth relative does not have an
existing relationship with the child does not prevent people from bargaining
for and agreeing to visitation in placements at birth. Outside of the

89. Id. at 312.
90. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 156 (“For some, closure is helpful in the
immediate crisis. This defense may continue for many years; even at a point later in life,
some birth parents cannot express feelings about the adoption and do not wish to deal
with the subject.”). The authors note, however, that this response to the loss may “come
at a great emotional cost to future recovery.” Id.
91. Id. (citation omitted).
92. See id. at 169.
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statute, there is no clear indication in the public materials published
by the State that there is any limitation on the types of contact to which
the parties can agree.
For example, the California Courts website provides self-help access
to a variety of forms to help adopting parents.93 Included on this site is a
standard form for postadoption contact agreements.94 This form lists
visitation as one of several options that the involved parties choose from
in structuring their ongoing contact, making no mention of the statutory
prohibition for birth parents who did not have an existing relationship
with the child.95 In fact, the form does not refer to the current statute at
all, though it does reference the old kinship adoption statute which was
even more limiting.96 The self-service web page also contains forms for:
requesting enforcement of a postadoption contact agreement;97 answering
an enforcement request;98 and for the judicial order to enforce, end, or
change a contact agreement.99 All of these forms mention other
requirements of the statute, such as the requirement to attempt mediation
before requesting judicial enforcement,100 but they make no mention of
any limitation on enforcement of visitation based on prior relationship
with the child. A party to a postadoption contract made using these
forms would have no idea that it would not be enforceable under the law.
Refusing to enforce an otherwise valid voluntary agreement made in
apparent compliance with the State’s own forms appears unfair. Courts
may disagree because the form does reference a statute and because

93. California Courts Self-Help Center, Adoption Forms, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
selfhelp/family/adoption/adoptforms.htm (last visited July 2, 2007).
94. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CONTACT AFTER ADOPTION AGREEMENT (rev.
2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/adopt310.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., REQUEST TO: ENFORCE, CHANGE, END CONTACT
AFTER ADOPTION AGREEMENT (rev. 2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/
adopt315.pdf.
98. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ANSWER TO REQUEST TO: ENFORCE, CHANGE, END
CONTACT AFTER ADOPTION AGREEMENT (rev. 2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/
adopt320.pdf.
99. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., JUDGE’S ORDER TO: ENFORCE, CHANGE, END
CONTACT AFTER ADOPTION AGREEMENT (rev. 2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/
adopt325.pdf.
100. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(h)(2)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
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citizens are presumed to know the law.101 Most would agree, however,
that people should not be entitled to gain from promises they do not
intend to keep.102 It follows, then, that birth parents who select specific
adoptive parents for placement of their child in reliance on a promise of
visitation should have recourse if that visitation is revoked without good
cause. Justice Rose said as much in her dissent when the Nevada
Supreme Court refused to enforce such an agreement:
I . . . believe it is patently unfair to have a biological parent agree to the
adoption of her or his child on the basis that continued contact will be
permitted, but upon approval of the adoption, refuse to enforce the continued
contact agreement. A parent may specifically agree to an adoption of a child
based on the ability to have periodic contact with the child. The enforcement of
the adoption agreement without also recognizing the contact provision leaves
the biological parent with an adoption she or he never would have agreed to
otherwise. We should not permit birth parents to be so misled.103

Other courts have held that such a misleading promise amounts to
coercion, and have invalidated adoptions on this basis.104 Though this
response deals with the fairness issue, it seems to ignore the best interests
of the child. Surely the child’s interests are most often better served by
enforcing the agreement and allowing the child to remain in the home he
or she has become accustomed to, with the only parents he or she may
have ever known, rather than by reversing the adoption.105 Fairness is
important but should not overshadow the child’s interests.
D. Encouraging Adoption
As mentioned in Part II of this Comment, the purpose of the original
kinship adoption agreement statute was to encourage adoptions from the

101. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) (“The claim that petitioners had a . . . right
to better notice . . . is without merit. All citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge
of the law . . . .”).
102. This situation is generally considered at best deceit, and at worst fraud. See,
e.g., Graham v. L.A. First Nat. Trust & Sav. Bank, 43 P.2d 543, 545 (Cal. 1935) (“A
promise made without any intention of performing it constitutes actual fraud and deceit.”
(citing Boulevard Land Co. v. King, 13 P.2d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932); Greenberg v. Du
Bain Realty Corp., 42 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1935))).
103. Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Nev. 2002) (Rose, J.,
dissenting).
104. Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that such a
challenge could be brought but dismissing the instant action as untimely); McCormick v.
State, 354 N.W.2d 160 (Neb. 1984).
105. For a thorough discussion of the legal and psychological reasons that a child
needs a stable environment, and the critical importance of continuity of care from his or
her caregiver, see generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (1996).
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foster care system by family members.106 It succeeded, and the legislature
cited this success in extending postadoption contact agreements to all
adoptions.107 The bill analysis indicates that the legislature was still
focused on facilitating adoptions out of foster care and hoped to reduce
birth parents’ resistance to voluntarily relinquishing their rights.108 Though
adoptions from voluntary relinquishments present a somewhat different
set of concerns than foster care adoptions, the California Supreme Court
has asserted that the State has a “clear interest in encouraging such
adoptions [by voluntary relinquishment] and providing stable homes for
children.”109 The court also noted that “[t]he state’s interest in this matter is
particularly important in light of the large number of children born to
unwed parents: some 25[%] of all children born in the United States
between July 1989 and July 1990—approximately 913,000 out of
3,900,000—were born out of wedlock.”110 The court does not explain why
being born out of wedlock presents a special problem for the State, but it
is presumably due to the economic realities of single motherhood.111
These realities are reflected in the most recent census reports. As of
2004, over 30% of people living in households headed by single mothers
were living below the poverty line.112 In contrast, adoptive parents tend

106. 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 793; CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.5(a)(1), (a)(2) (West, Westlaw
through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
107. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2000), available at
CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 3/28/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose
of legislation).
108. Id.
109. Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 898 (Cal. 1995).
110. Id.
111. Though children that might otherwise be placed for adoption sometimes live
with their fathers, single-mother families are far more common, and therefore are the
focus here. See TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) (1998), http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/
p20-514.pdf.
The majority of children who lived with a single parent in 1998 lived with their
mother (84.1 percent). About 40.3 percent of these children lived with
mothers who had never been married. Children who lived with their father
only were more likely to be living with a divorced father (44.4 percent) than
with a never-married father (33.3 percent).
Id.
112. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES, TABLE 2, POVERTY
STATUS OF PEOPLE BY FAMILY RELATIONSHIP, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1959 TO
2005, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov2.html (last visited July
2, 2007).
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to be financially well off.113 Thus, the State’s interest in encouraging
adoption may be linked to a desire to minimize the number of children
living in poverty.114 Some studies show that placing a child for adoption
also has economic and educational benefits for the birth mother.115
Whatever the reasons, to the extent that the State does hope to encourage
adoptions from voluntarily relinquishment, it should extend the same
opportunities for visitation that have been effective in encouraging
adoptions from foster care.116
Though the preceding reasons clearly support an increase of the scope
of birth relative visitation, it may also be helpful to explore reasons that
have been given for limiting it. These reasons vary but can be classified
into three categories: (1) fear of a chilling effect on adoptions; (2) concern
that adoptions would be disrupted or revoked; and (3) desire to protect
the newly created family unit and with it the new parents’ autonomy.
E. Chilling Effect
Some argue that allowing visitation agreements in all adoptions would
discourage potential parents who might otherwise adopt from pursuing
domestic adoption. In fact, it has been argued that recent increases in
birth parent rights in the United States have led to the increase in
international adoptions.117 Evidence supporting this theory is scant.
Proponents tend to cite the increasing numbers of international adoptions
and the declining number of domestic adoptions as indicative of this
problem, but these correlations do not show that increasing openness and
birth parent bargaining power is the cause.118 The true source of this
trend is more likely a decline in the number of American women who
are willing to carry babies to term and then relinquish them for adoption.119

113. See Stolley, supra note 9, at 38.
114. Poverty is not the only hazard the children of unwed mothers face. For
example, even accounting for factors like poverty and low parent education, adolescents
raised without fathers are more likely to be incarcerated than their peers who have
fathers in the home. Cynthia C. Harper & Sara S. McLanahan, Father Absence and
Youth Incarceration, 14 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 369 (2004).
115. MADELYN FREUNDLICH, THE MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION 67–68 (2000)
(citing multiple studies).
116. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2000), available at
CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 3/28/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose
of legislation).
117. See, e.g., Alison Fleisher, Note, The Decline of Domestic Adoption: Intercountry
Adoption as a Response to Local Adoption Laws and Proposals to Foster Domestic
Adoption, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 171 (2003).
118. Id. at 181–82.
119. Fleisher acknowledges as much:
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The number of American families seeking to adopt domestically greatly
exceeds the number of available infants in the United States.120 Thus,
even if some potential adoptive parents were deterred from adopting
domestically because of birth parents’ desire for visitation, it is unlikely
that this would have any real impact on American infants’ prospects for
adoption.121 Moreover, there is a critical shortage of adoptive parents for
foster children, who are often older or have special needs.122 If families
who are not interested in or cannot afford international adoption are
deterred from adopting a domestic infant by the prospect of a postadoption
contact agreement, perhaps they will consider adopting from this needier
population. Many of the children freed for adoption out of the foster
care system achieve this status through the court’s termination of
parental rights. Since termination is involuntary, the birth parents have
much less leverage to negotiate a postadoption contact agreement if the
adopting parents do not want one.

The number of American pregnancies is lower [now] than [it was] at any point
in the last two decades. . . . At the same time, innovations in and access to
contraceptive technology, cultural values, and constitutional law have
transformed the institution of adoption. In addition, recent statistics show that
22% of pregnancies are terminated by abortion. Another factor is that infertility
has significantly risen, partly due to a 50% decrease in sperm counts over the
last century. Furthermore, fewer children born to single parents are relinquished
for adoption. Hence, as contraception, abortion, infertility, and the tendency of
single parents to keep their children have increased, there have been fewer
domestic infants available for adoption.
Id. at 174–75 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
120. According to a National Adoption Information Clearinghouse estimate, less
than 14,000 children were voluntarily relinquished in the United States in 2003, and in
1995 the number of American women seeking to adopt was over 200,000. NAT’L
ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT FOR ADOPTION 1 (2005),
http://childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_place.pdf [hereinafter VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT]; NAT’L
ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, PERSONS SEEKING TO ADOPT 3 (2005), http://childwelfare.
gov/pubs/s_seek.pdf [hereinafter PERSONS SEEKING TO ADOPT]. A large number of these
would-be parents are looking for a “domestically born white baby.” Samuels, supra note
78, at 521. The ratio of prospective adopters to available white American infants has
been estimated at six-to-one. Id.
121. Indeed, some argue that this imbalance between supply and demand justifies
treating adoption as a “market” and allowing birth parents to negotiate for a variety of
benefits, including compensation, in exchange for placing their child with a specific
family. Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV.
59, 60–61 (1987). Judge Posner also suggests that by providing an incentive for women
to place children for adoption, payment could reduce the number of abortions and
increase the available supply of infants for adoptions to everyone’s benefit. Id. at 63–64.
122. Samuels, supra note 78, at 510–11.

375

WIDNER.DOC

8/15/2007 2:56:32 PM

It is possible, though entirely speculative, that enforcing postadoption
visitation agreements could deter some potential parents from adopting.
However, the specter of a chilling effect should not cause much concern,
at least under a law like California’s. First, in California, postadoption
contact agreements must be entered into voluntarily by all parties,123 so
adopting parents can choose what, if any, degree of contact they are
comfortable with, and select or negotiate with a birth mother accordingly.
Second, not all birth mothers are interested in visitation. Some may not
be interested in ongoing contact at all.124 Third, the option of international
adoption remains open to those who have difficulty connecting with a
domestic birth mother with whom they can agree about ongoing contact.125
F. Harassment and Adoption Revocation Concerns
Some adopting parents shy away from open adoption because they
worry that the birth parent will constantly besiege them,126 or, worse,
will try to get the child back.127 It seems that a fear of some sort of
harassment might have been the root of the California legislature’s
concern in creating section 8616.5’s limitation on visitation where there
was no existing relationship. The bill analysis states that this provision
of the statute is intended to “ensure[] that the child and the adoptive
parents are not subjected to continuing contact with birth relatives with
whom the child had no relationship at the time of adoption.”128

123. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
124. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 156. While this Comment agrees with the
cited authors that ongoing contact is generally better for the child, the specific wants and
needs of the individual parties involved in a particular adoption are important
considerations as well. This Comment advocates open adoptions only to the extent that
they are truly voluntary for the parties involved.
125. Few international adoptions include birth parent contact. While it is true that
international adoption is more expensive, and therefore may not be available to all
would-be parents, it is a viable alternative for many who prefer to avoid dealing with
birth parents. See Fleisher, supra note 117.
126. Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 328 (noting a common fear of “interference,
intrusive behavior, and rivalry”).
127. A 2002 survey of adoption attitudes in America found that 82% of respondents
would have a “major concern,” if they were planning to adopt, about “being sure that the
birth parents could not take the child back.” This would be a “minor concern” for 12%
and “no concern at all” for only 6%. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, NATIONAL ADOPTION ATTITUDES
SURVEY 29 (2002), http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/survey/Adoption_Attitudes_ Survey.pdf.
This fear persists even though most challenges to completed adoptions fail. See Samuels,
supra note 78, at 548–66 (recounting various failed attempts to challenge adoptions).
128. Minors: Adoptions/Dependent Children: Hearing on A.B. 2921 Before the S.
Rules Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 6 (Cal. 2000), available at CA B. An., A.B.
2921 Sen., 8/22/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose of legislation).
The analysis provides no further elaboration on why being “subjected” to continuing
contact might be bad. Id.
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The protections afforded by the current California statute should
alleviate most harassment and adoption revocation concerns. Birth
relatives are unable to harass the adoptive parents by constantly dragging
them to court to litigate the agreement. The law provides that there can
be no court enforcement unless there has first been a good faith effort at
mediation,129 and the parties must pay their own mediation expenses.130
If mediation fails and the matter goes before the court, the party bringing
the action is responsible for all costs unless the other party is found to
have violated the agreement without good cause.131 The law does not
allow actions for monetary damages,132 and the court cannot order a
burdensome investigation by a public or private agency absent a clear
finding that it is necessary and is the only way to protect the child’s
interests.133 Thus the cost of bringing a frivolous action is high and there
is no possibility of monetary gain, so it is extremely unlikely that a birth
parent could use the agreement in an unfairly harassing way. Some
adoptive parents may see any enforcement attempt as harassment. But
while a legitimate enforcement attempt may be an annoyance, it is one
that the adoptive parents have bargained for. If this is a concern for
lawmakers, it would be better addressed by requiring counseling services
and legal disclosures for adoptive parents similar to those required for
birth parents134 to ensure that their decisions to agree to visitation are
deliberate and fully informed.
It should also be noted that the class of birth parents who are arguably
the most likely to cause problems are already allowed to enter visitation
agreements, if the adopting family consents. Those who have had their
children taken away because they are unstable, abusive, dependent on
alcohol or drugs, or severely mentally ill will generally qualify as having
an existing relationship with the child because the child lived with them
prior to removal.135 In contrast, available data shows that most women
129. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(f) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
130. Id. § 8616.5(i).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 8616.5(g).
133. Id. § 8616.5(f).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 194–208.
135. Because the California statute does not clearly define “existing relationship,” it
is unclear what age a child must achieve to be considered capable of having a
relationship. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 10% of
children awaiting adoption in California foster care in 2003 were less than one year old.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2003, at VI-35
(2003), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo03/cwo03.pdf. This is the group
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who voluntarily relinquish infants at birth have both higher income and
education levels and higher career and educational aspirations.136 Yet
these are the birth parents excluded from visitation under the current
law.137 If harassment is the concern, the choice of this population to
exclude from visitation seems arbitrary at best.
Still, some adoptive parents may be concerned that because women
relinquishing at birth tend to be younger138 they may be less mature and
therefore more inclined to change their minds and want their children
back. However, there is no empirical evidence to support this fear, and
some experts believe that birth parents in open adoptions are better able
to accept the situation than those who never get to see their children
thriving in their new homes.139 And once an adoption is final, it is extremely
unlikely to be reversed.140 This is particularly true in California because
of the explicit terms of the postadoption contact agreement statute. Its
most important protection guarantees that the adoption cannot be set
aside for failure to comply with a postadoption contact agreement.141
Therefore a postadoption contact agreement poses no threat to the finality
of an otherwise properly completed adoption.
of children that seem most likely to be outside that definition. In 2003, 35.8% of
children awaiting adoption in California foster care were between one and five years-ofage. Id. Some of these children would arguably have had existing relationships with
their birth relatives at the time they were removed from their families. The remaining
54.2% of children on which data was provided were six years old or older and,
depending on how long they had been in foster care, most of these children would likely
have had “existing relationships” with their birth parents. Id.
136. VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT, supra note 120, at 1.
137. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.) does not
define “existing relationship,” but it seems clear that a child relinquished at birth is
outside of the visitation provision. For other states’ attempts to define the degree of
relationship required, see IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2 (West, Westlaw through 2006
Pub. Laws) (requiring that the child be “at least two (2) years of age” and that “there is a
significant emotional attachment between the child and the birth parent”); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess. Acts) (requiring “an established,
significant relationship” whose loss “would cause substantial harm to the child”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) (requiring “a significant
emotional attachment between the child and the birth parent”).
138. Statistical information on birth parents is spotty and incomplete. Most of the
existing research focuses on unwed teen parents who relinquish their children at birth.
Though these studies are most likely underinclusive, authorities seem to accept that these
younger mothers make up the majority of those voluntarily relinquishing infants. See
VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT, supra note 120, at 1.
139. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 156 (“[B]irth mothers who choose open
adoption may be better able to tolerate feelings of loss and ambivalence. A mother can
take great comfort in knowing her child as he or she grows up, while accepting that she
cannot be the primary parent.”).
140. See Samuels, supra note 78, at 557–65 (reviewing cases from around the
country in which birth mothers have sought, usually unsuccessfully, to set aside their
consents to adoption).
141. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
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G. Protection of the New Family Unit and the New Parents’ Autonomy
The third argument against broadening birth relative visitation
agreements is that the newly formed family needs to be protected and
allowed to develop as a natural family would. Many courts, when refusing
to enforce postadoption contact agreements, have reasoned that the
agreements violate public policy by interfering with a new family unit
that has all of the rights and obligations of a biological family unit.142
For example, a Louisiana court taking this view stated:
[A]doptive parents have the same right of custody and control of the child as if
that child had been born to them and blood parents are relieved of all their legal
duties and divested of all their legal rights in respect to the adopted child. An
agreement providing for visitation by a third party would impair the adoptive
parents’ rights. Such an agreement might also impair the new parent-child
relationship with very undesirable consequences.143

However, this view of adoption is becoming increasingly anachronistic.144
Since the mid-1970s, the adoption process has become increasingly
open. Most adoptive parents tell their adopted children about their
biological origins,145 and adoption records are increasingly open.146 Both
trends reflect that adoptive families no longer rely on the fiction that the
child, in order to thrive, must be treated “as if that child had been born to

142. See, e.g., In re W.E.G., 710 P.2d 410, 415 (Alaska 1985) (“The theory of the
adoption statute is that such welfare will be best promoted by giving an adopted child the
status of a natural child . . . . Public policy demands that an adoption carry with it a
complete breaking of old ties . . . .”) (omissions in original) (quoting Browning v.
Tarwater, 524 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Kan. 1974)); In re Adoption of Hammer, 487 P.2d 417,
420 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985, 986 (Okla. 1977) (“The purpose of
adoption proceedings is to terminate all legal relationships and rights between a minor
child and its natural parents, and to establish these rights in the adoptive parents . . . .
Public policy requires the severance of all old ties.”) (citing Browning, 524 P.2d 1135);
Whetmore v. Fratello, 252 P.2d 1083, 1083 (Or. 1953) (“The principle underlying
adoption is primarily to promote the welfare of the child, and, unquestionably, this would
not be subserved by having a split relationship.”); Stickles v. Reichardt, 234 N.W. 728,
730 (Wis. 1931); In re Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 970 (Wyo. 1990).
143. Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681, 681–82 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted).
144. For example, since Hill Louisiana has adopted a statute similar to California’s
allowing enforcement of some postadoption contact agreements. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN.
art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess. Acts).
145. See E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE
HISTORY OF ADOPTION 137 (1998).
146. WEGAR, supra note 73, at 17–20 (1997) (recognizing this trend although “most
states and agencies have not unsealed their records.”).
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them.”147 Moreover, some studies indicate that adoptive families who
acknowledge the differences inherent in their situation function better
than those that deny them.148
Additionally, alternative family structures are becoming more common
and accepted. Experience with these different types of family structures
shows that children are able to adjust to many kinds of complex extended
family relationships, including open adoptions.149 The Connecticut Supreme
Court observed as much in a case upholding an open adoption agreement:
Traditional models of the nuclear family have come, in recent years, to be
replaced by various configurations of parents, stepparents, adoptive parents and
grandparents. We are not prepared to assume that the welfare of children is best
served by a narrow definition of those whom we permit to continue to manifest
their deep concern for a child’s growth and development.150

Still, many adoption professionals and commentators believe that the
traditional nuclear family is the preferred setting for children,151 and they
see enforcement of visitation rights for birth relatives as “inimical to the
meaning of adoption, as creating ‘in all respects’ a new family to replace
the child’s birth family.”152
Indeed, this is the primary reason that the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) chose not to require
enforcement of most postadoption contact agreements in the Uniform
Adoption Act (UAA).153 The UAA only provides for postadoption contact
agreements in stepparent adoptions, because “stepparent adoption results
in the creation of a legal family that comes as close as possible to the
nuclear family.”154 However, the resistance to enforceable postadoption
contact agreements among the drafters of the UAA is not simply about a
preference for traditional families. It also stems from a desire to allow
the adoptive family to be “unfettered,”155 and to have the “new family
protected by legal guarantees of privacy and autonomy.”156

147.
148.

Hill, 525 So. 2d at 681.
See Kenneth Kaye, Acknowledgment or Rejection of Differences?, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 8, at 121, 121–22, 131–32 (discussing and
updating the findings in H. DAVID KIRK, SHARED FATE (1964)).
149. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 154–55.
150. Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 742 (Conn. 1988) (citations omitted).
151. Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and
Enforceability of Visitation Orders for Former Parents Under Uniform Adoption Act
§ 4-113, 51 FLA. L. REV. 89, 107 (1999).
152. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter’s Ruminations,
30 FAM. L.Q. 345, 373 (1996).
153. Id.
154. Mahoney, supra note 151, at 107.
155. Hollinger, supra note 152, at 348.
156. Mahoney, supra note 151, at 99.
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The United States Supreme Court has also stressed the importance of
parental autonomy and freedom from interference. In Troxel v. Granville157
the Court invalidated a Washington State statute which permitted any
person to petition the court for visitation of a child, and allowed a judge
to order such visitation over a parent’s objections if the judge felt
visitation was in the best interests of the child.158 In making this
determination, the Court clarified that “it cannot now be doubted that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children.”159 The Court concluded that this
right encompassed the power to make decisions about whether or not the
child’s grandparents could have visitation.160
However, even if California expands its postadoption contact agreement,
as this Comment recommends, the statute would not run afoul of the
constitutional right of parents to make decisions about “the care,
custody, and control of their children”161 because such agreements would be
the result of voluntary decisions by the adoptive parents. The Court
stressed in Troxel that the Washington law was “breathtakingly broad”
because “a parent’s decision that visitation would not be in the child’s
best interest is accorded no deference” but rather “the best-interest
determination [was placed] solely in the hands of the judge.”162 If
California were to remove its restriction on visitation for birth relatives
who did not have an existing relationship with the child, however, the
adoptive families would still be deciding whether or not to allow
visitation.163 Section 8616.5 does infringe upon adoptive parents’ autonomy
to some extent by not allowing them to change their minds once they
commit to allow visitation, but it reserves autonomy over that initial
commitment. The adoptive parents’ privacy will only be invaded to the
degree they agree to visitation up front. And, as has already been
157. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 66.
160. Id. at 68.
161. Id. at 66.
162. Id. at 66–67.
163. While the statute at issue in Troxel, id. at 67, and the UAA’s stepparent
visitation provision in Mahoney, supra note 151, at 96, both allow courts to issue visitation
orders even where the adopting parent does not agree, the California postadoption
contact agreement statute requires voluntary agreement. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). This Comment does not advocate a change to
that requirement.
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demonstrated, this limited invasion of autonomy is more than warranted
by compelling public policy considerations.164
Of course, there may be situations where ongoing visitation will not
work because of serious personality conflicts or birth relatives who
exceed agreed-upon boundaries. In these cases the adoptive parents and
adopted child are protected by the requirement that the postadoption
contact agreement be in the best interests of the child.165 If a birth relative’s
behavior is unduly intrusive or disrupts the functioning of the new
family, and attempts to mediate the problem fail, the adoptive parents
can file for termination of the agreement on the grounds that such
termination is in the child’s best interests.166 However, since the birth
relatives’ involvement is often motivated by concern for the child,
this will normally be unnecessary; the impact on the child and the
potential loss of contact should be enough to inspire them to modify
their behavior.
Weighing the arguments for and against expansion of the visitation
provision of section 8616.5 demonstrates that this expansion is both
warranted and desirable. However, in order for postadoption contact
agreements to promote the State’s public policy goals, birth parents must
be aware of their availability.
IV. THE CASE FOR NOTIFYING BIRTH PARENTS THAT
POSTADOPTION CONTACT IS AN OPTION
Under the current law, however, there is no requirement that birth
parents who are considering voluntarily relinquishing their children through
private agency or independent adoptions be told of this option.167 California
Court of Appeal cases indicate that this is because the legislature did not
require notification168 and because the need for notification does not rise
to the level of a due process right.169
The Court of Appeal has noted, however, that notice of the opportunity to
form a contact agreement would often be appropriate and desirable.170
State Senators agreed in the case of public agency adoptions.171 The

164. See supra Part III.A–D.
165. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(f) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
166. Id. § 8616.5(h)(2)(A).
167. In re Zachary D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Ct. App. 1999); In re Kimberly S., 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 1999).
168. See In re Kimberly S., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747.
169. See In re Zachary D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 408.
170. Id. at 408.
171. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2000), available at

382

WIDNER.DOC

[VOL. 44: 355, 2007]

8/15/2007 2:56:32 PM

Continuing the Evolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

2000 amendments relating to postadoption contact agreements required
that the social study conducted for the court in dependency cases address
whether or not the social worker discussed a postadoption contact
agreement with the child’s birth parents.172 The bill analysis stated that
the purpose of this provision was to “ensure that birth parents are aware
of this option, and thus perhaps alleviate their concerns and resistance to
placing their child for adoption.”173 Votes on this version of the bill in
the Senate were unanimously in its favor.174 These provisions are still in
effect, but apply only in cases of adoptions of children who are dependents
of the court.175 No attempt has been made to extend notification to birth
parents outside the dependency system.
California’s adoption laws do require that birth parents considering
independent adoptions be informed of a host of other things before they
consent to the adoption.176 These include: the alternatives to adoption;177
the different types of adoption, including the applicable procedures and
time frames;178 their right to separate legal counsel paid for by the
adopting parents;179 and the right to counseling sessions paid for by the
adopting parents.180 This information must be related by an adoption
service provider181 in a face-to-face meeting in which the birth parent
has the right to ask questions and have them answered.182 This meeting
must occur at least ten days before the birth parent signs the adoption
placement agreement.183 The adoption cannot be set aside for failure to
follow this procedure, but such failure may give the birth parent a cause

CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 3/28/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose
of legislation).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157
Before the Assemb. Comm. on Human Servs., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 (Cal. 2000),
available at CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Assem., 6/21/2000 (Westlaw); Dependent Children:
Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157 Before the S. Rules Comm.,
1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 (Cal. 2000), available at CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen.,
4/04/2000 (Westlaw).
175. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8715 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
176. Id. § 8801.5.
177. Id. § 8801.5(c)(1).
178. Id. § 8801.5(c)(2).
179. Id. § 8801.5(c)(4).
180. Id. § 8801.5(c)(5).
181. Id. § 8801.5(a).
182. Id. § 8801.5(b).
183. Id. § 8801.3(b)(1).

383

WIDNER.DOC

8/15/2007 2:56:32 PM

of action for negligence or malpractice against the adoption service
provider.184 Thus, the statutory scheme ensures that the birth parent’s
consent is informed while protecting the adoption from being overturned.185
The provision requiring the birth parent to be informed of the alternative
types of adoption available186 could be interpreted to include a discussion of
traditional closed adoption versus open adoption which would extend
to a discussion of postadoption contact agreements. However, this is
not how the California Administrative Code interprets the provision.187
Instead, the regulation defines this section as requiring an explanation of
the legal types of adoption under the California system, such as standard
agency relinquishment adoption,188 designated agency relinquishment
adoption,189 and independent adoptions.190
V. RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY
SCHEME FOR POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS
Public policy considerations favor revising California Family Code
section 8616.5 to allow visitation in all postadoption contact agreements.191
Children’s best interests are served by allowing them to have relationships
with birth relatives because this enables them to easily access information
about their genealogical, personal, and medical histories, and to have a
larger support network of people who love them.192 Birth parents’
well-being is protected when the law protects the adoptive placements in
which they have carefully planned and invested.193 Fundamental principles
of fairness are upheld by enforcing private agreements that have this
level of personal significance and societal importance.194 Finally, the
State’s interest in encouraging adoption is served by providing a more
palatable alternative for individuals who want to give their children a

184. Id. § 8801.5(g).
185. Arguably, the State could go further in protecting birth parents in this regard.
As Elizabeth Samuels notes in her excellent analysis of the consent process, though
adoption laws attempt to advance two goals, “ensuring that birth parents make informed
and deliberate decisions” and “protecting the finality of placements,” the latter often takes
precedent. Samuels, supra note 78.
186. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5(c)(2).
187. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 35094.2 (2005).
188. Id. § 35094.2(c)(3)(A).
189. Id. § 35094.2(c)(3)(B).
190. Id. § 35094.2(c)(3)(C), (c)(3)(D).
191. See supra Part III.
192. See supra Part III.A.
193. See supra Part III.B.
194. See supra Part III.C.
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chance for a stable family life that they cannot currently provide, but
who cannot bring themselves to completely sever all ties to their child.195
Therefore, the legislature should eliminate section 8616.5(b)(3), which
limits postadoption contact agreements to “the sharing of information
about the child unless the child has an existing relationship with the birth
relative.”196 This simple amendment will allow birth parents and adopting
parents to negotiate the level of contact they find appropriate without any
arbitrary restrictions. It would leave intact the protections already provided
to adoptive parents and adopted children197 while helping California to
promote its interest in encouraging adoptions.198
The California legislature also should amend California Family Code
section 8801.5199 and its interpreting regulation200 to require that birth
parents be specifically told that they have a right to negotiate with the
adoptive parent for ongoing contact with or regarding the child. The
amendment should also require that birth parents be told that if the
agreement meets the statutory requirements it will be enforceable, but
that the adoption cannot be revoked for failure to comply with an
otherwise valid agreement.201 This will allow the legislature to encourage
adoption by increasing awareness of arrangements that may make adoption
a more palatable option for many birth parents. It will also reduce the
risk that birth parents will regret or contest adoptions by empowering
birth parents to make fully informed choices about the placement of their
children.202
Proactively informing birth parents is important because most people
who find themselves involved in an unwanted pregnancy know little or
nothing about the law in this area,203 and birth parents are not required to
be represented by their own counsel.204 Although they must be informed
of their right to have the adopting parents pay for separate counsel, they
may be too overwhelmed or too trusting of the adopting parents to assert

195. See supra Part III.D.
196. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 44–54.
198. See supra Part III.D.
199. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
200. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 35094.2 (2005).
201. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
202. See Samuels, supra note 78, at 512.
203. Pamela K. Strom Amlung, Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Independent Adoptions:
Pitfalls for the Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 169, 171 (1990).
204. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8627, 8800 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).
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that right. Even in cases where the adopting parents do pay for separate
counsel, the attorney will have a potential conflict of interest and may
not feel comfortable advocating options to which the adopting parents
would be adverse.205 The State already seems to acknowledge birth parents’
general lack of knowledge of the law when it requires the disclosures
described above.206 Requiring information about postadoption contact
agreements to be included in these disclosures would further ensure that
consents are fully informed.
VI. CONCLUSION
California has enacted a progressive statute that encourages adoptions
by recognizing the legitimate needs and desires of adoptees and birth
relatives for ongoing contact. However, the current statute draws an
unnecessary, arbitrary line by preventing birth relatives who do not have
an existing relationship from having postadoption visitation. The California
legislature should amend California Family Code section 8616.5 to
abolish this limitation and amend California Family Code section 8801.5
to require that birth parents be informed regarding postadoption contact
agreements. With these changes, California’s law can serve as a model for
legislatures across the country and demonstrate how they can balance the
needs of all those involved in the adoption process: adoptive parents,
adoptees, and birth parents.

205. While the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do permit a lawyer to accept
payment from a third party, they also acknowledge the potential conflict of interest this
can create and require the lawyer to get informed consent to the conflict if the risk is
“significant.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 13 (2005). Samuels notes
that adoption is a $2 billion a year industry and that money comes almost entirely from
adoptive parents. See Samuels, supra note 78, at 518–25. As such, social workers and
attorneys may feel compelled to favor the paying customer, rather than the usually
economically disadvantaged birth parents.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 176–85.
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